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ABSTRACT 
 
Digital platforms confer competitive advantage through superior architectural con-
figurations. There is however still a dearth of research that sheds light on the compet-
itive attributes which define platform competition from an architectural standpoint. 
To disentangle platform competition, we opted for the mobile payment market in the 
United Kingdom (UK) as our empirical setting. By conceptualizing digital platforms 
as layered modular architectures and embracing the theoretical lens of strategic 
groups, this study supplements prior research by deriving a taxonomy of platform 
profiles that is grounded on the strategic dimensions of value creation and value de-
livery architectures. We discover that mobile payment platforms could be delineated 
based on whether they are: (1) integrative or integratable on their value creation ar-
chitecture; and (2) have direct, indirect, or open access on their value delivery archi-
tecture. The preceding attributes of value creation architecture and value delivery ar-
chitecture aided us in identifying six profiles associated with mobile payment plat-
forms, which in turn led us to advance three competitive strategies that could be pur-
sued by digital platforms in network economies. 
Keywords: Competition, digital infrastructures, digital platforms, financial tech-
nologies, mobile payments, network economies, strategic groups 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The platformization of digital goods and services is a growing trend in many industries. Digital plat-
forms [16] (hereafter platforms) are layered modular information technology (IT) architectures [74, 80] 
embedded within business networks [2, 66]. Within these business networks, platforms function as in-
novation hubs in offering services (e.g., payments) that emphasize mediation and modularity [68, 80]. 
Platform owners (e.g., Apple) and platform complementors (e.g., developers) collaborate to develop 
respective firm-specific components to co-create valued platform derivatives1 (e.g., apps) [20, 27, 62]. 
Because platforms constitute a vital source of competitive advantage within networked economies, 
there has been an enduring stream of research that examines how platforms effectively compete [7, 8, 
60]. Scholars have attested to the criticality of matching mechanisms (e.g., pricing) in attracting and 
retaining stakeholders. A core premise of these studies is that successful platforms must induce positive 
and sustainable network effects to appeal to stakeholders. In the same vein, platformization has revolu-
tionized the financial service industry by altering the manner through which value is created and deliv-
ered. Emerging technologies in the likes of blockchain and cryptocurrency have displaced conventional 
modes of transactions (e.g., centralized payment networks controlled by market incumbents) by intro-
ducing alternative value creation and delivery architectures that function as open, decentralized peer-
to-peer (P2P) platforms. This in turn compels market incumbents to redesign their financial service 
offerings to harness the benefits of platformization and remain competitive within networked econo-
mies. 
Yet, despite the disruption brought about by platformization, we have limited knowledge of how digital 
platforms compete from an architectural standpoint [5]. Responding to calls for an in-depth appreciation 
of the impact of architectural configurations on digital platform competition [5], we draw on previous 
literature on interfirm competition. Specifically, we espouse the theoretical lens of strategic groups to 
unpack the dimensions upon which interfirm rivalries are built [18, 44]. Research has delineated and 
clustered firms into strategic groups to account for their competitive dynamics. Past studies hold that 
firms belonging to the same strategic group possess comparable competitive attributes, and thus, com-
pete more fiercely with group members (intragroup competition) than with members from another stra-
tegic group (intergroup competition). By embracing the theoretical lens of strategic groups, we aim to 
contribute to an in-depth appreciation of how different platform-driven strategic groups configure their 
technological architectures to bolster their competitiveness. 
The mobile payments market in the United Kingdom (UK) is highly mature and competition is driven 
primarily by advances in financial technology – fintech innovation – among incumbents and contenders. 
Long-standing relationships among market incumbents and costly access to established payment infra-
structures have compartmentalized competition by forcing select players to band together to compete 
with incumbents. The fragmentation of the UK mobile payments market into competing factions hence 
conforms to the classical conception of strategic groups, and serves as an excellent empirical context 
for our investigation into digital platform competition. Through case studies of multiple mobile pay-
ment platforms in the UK market, we strive to provide answers to two research questions: What are the 
strategic attributes that define platform competition from an architecture standpoint? What are generic 
platform strategies within networked economies?  
This study contributes to a deeper understanding of how digital financial services such as mobile pay-
ments are leveraging on platform design to revolutionize their strategies within a regulated market en-
vironment. Synthesizing prior research, we identify two distinct strategic dimensions of digital platform 
competition: (1) value creation architecture, and; (2) value delivery architecture. In turn, the configu-
ration of these two strategic dimensions shape the strategic orientation of platforms in the market. Our 
analysis generated six discrete platform profiles, each exemplified by a corresponding mobile payment 
service that seeks to revolutionize its offerings. The profiles serve as the basis on which to unravel 
                                                             
1 We employ the term platform derivatives to describe technological by-products of digital platforms that are 
constructed on the basis of developmental tools (e.g., application programming interfaces (APIs) or software de-
velopment kits (SDKs)) supplied by these platforms. 
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digital platform competition. Our findings further reveal that these six platform profiles translate into 
three distinct platform strategies, each with its own merits and shortcomings. 
2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
2.1 Overview of Literature on Mobile Platforms 
Research into mobile payments has received substantial attention among scholars in their bid to explain 
the logic behind how mobile payment service providers innovate and compete [14, 32, 50]. Indeed, 
most mobile payment studies are centered on attempts to illuminate the drivers of service adoption [63], 
such as: exploring the cooperative and competitive dynamics among mobile payment providers within 
industries [17, 32]; prescribing the strategic design of mobile payment platforms/services towards mar-
ket ignition [49]; revealing the challenges of creating a mobile payments market in the first place [50]; 
or scrutinizing the potential of novel mobile payment technologies (e.g., near field communication 
(NFC)) [15, 48]. A common theme among these studies is that they largely treat the external market as 
their unit of analysis (e.g., multi-sided platform perspective), thereby constraining our knowledge of 
how mobile payment platforms compete from an architectural standpoint. Past studies of digital plat-
forms hint that such platforms achieve competitiveness through superior architectural configurations 
that are less susceptible to replication [51]. 
Arguably, one way of comprehending digital platform competition is to theoretically dissect such plat-
forms into layered modular technology architectures [80]. We contend that competitive mobile payment 
platforms embody differentiated architectural configurations that mirror their strategic orientation. In 
turn, these strategic orientations in conjunction with their matching architectural configurations trans-
late into distinct platform strategies, which when combined, form the basis for competition within the 
mobile payments market. We hence turn to the research stream on strategic groups as an appropriate 
theoretical lens for characterizing digital platform competition in the mobile payments market. 
2.2 Strategic Groups: An Overview 
Scholars have employed strategic groups as a theoretical lens [44] to uncover why certain firms in the 
same industry perform better than their rivals. The term strategic groups was first coined by Hunt [35] 
to explain firm competition in the home appliance industry. Firms belonging to the same strategic group 
exhibit similar competitive attributes and market orientations, they differ from those strategic groups 
that target other segments of the same industry [44, 70]. Porter [56, p. 129] proposed a more granular 
view on strategic groups, describing them as a “group of firms in an industry following the same or a 
similar strategy along the strategic dimensions”. The methods by which firms compete are heteroge-
neous, as varying emphases are placed on different competitive attributes. 
To derive strategic groups, scholars applied a myriad of competitive attributes, which include: available 
resources (e.g., distribution channels, assets, and technology) [6, 12, 45]; cognitive factors (e.g., top 
management perception, reputation, and identity) [24, 52, 58]; or economic conditions (e.g., prod-
uct/service portfolio, firm performance and size, sales, margin, profit, and market share) [25, 42, 65]. 
Past studies further indicated that firms’ dynamic capabilities can solidify the barriers of strategic 
groups [40, 69]. Yet, despite extensive research on strategic groups, previous work has centered on 
traditional industries and largely ignored firms situated in networked economies such as platform-
driven market environments. 
2.3 Strategic Groups within Industrialized Economies 
Porter [56] claimed that firms’ affiliation with strategic groups stems from having control over limited 
resources. By belonging to the same strategic group, members can install mobility barriers to preclude 
other firms from entering, or discouraging member firms from leaving the group at will [28]. Mobility 
barriers reflect segregation strategies adopted by strategic group members to designate and enforce 
conditions of loyalty through controlling member firms’ access to exclusive shared resources.  
Past studies suggest that competitive attributes underlying mobility barriers are typically idiosyncratic 
to the industry [44, 56]. Mascarenhas and Aaker’s [43] work on the oil-drilling industry suggests that 
competitive attributes in one industry (e.g., offshore drilling capabilities) may not be applicable to oth-
ers. The study by Mehra [45] in the US banking sector revealed that configurations of industry-specific 
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resources also constitute definitive attributes of strategic groups. Mehra [45] noted that the ownership 
of strategic resources, by itself, does not necessarily generate competitive benefits, countering instead 
that optimal “configurations of [strategic] resources” are necessary to unlock their full potential. In 
light of the abovementioned studies, we contend that strategic groups are mainly shaped by industry 
specific resources and that the composition and configuration of these resources serve as the foundation 
for how firms within a given industry compete with one another. 
2.4 Strategic Groups within Networked Economies 
Increasingly, firm competition is driven by networked business logics in which strategic linkages are 
forged among multiple firms to pool complementary capabilities and resources to augment one an-
other’s products and services [4, 13, 19, 30]. The motivation for firms is to build up sustainable com-
petitive advantage that is grounded in valuable, rare, and inimitable joint resources [cf. 13]. Gulati et 
al. [30] argued that a firm’s network, comprising a set of strategic linkages, constitutes its own inimita-
ble firm resource because they are rooted in complex managerial processes and difficult to replicate [4]. 
Within the automotive industry, Nohria and Garcia-Pont [47] maintained that strategic linkages among 
automakers (e.g., joint ventures) form an indispensable competitive resource, as they circumvent certain 
resource constraints (e.g., patents), and other organizational shortcomings. This aids firms in overcom-
ing entry barriers installed by existing or emerging strategic groups. Accordingly, firms, which lack 
industry-specific resources, can forge linkages with other firms to compensate for their own organiza-
tional deficiencies. Similarly, in networked economies where firms are intricately connected, access or 
control over strategic linkages is a valuable resource [cf. 30, 53]. 
Beyond having access to strategic linkages, the configuration of such strategic linkages is equally im-
portant for realizing the potential of interfirm relationships [23, 45, 51]. Configuration is the purposeful 
arrangement and combination of functional elements to generate a desired output [23]. Similar to the 
notion of combinative capabilities [37, p. 508] where firms compete through “new resource combina-
tions [i.e. configurations] that are rare, valuable, hardly imitable, and non-substitutable”, firms pur-
posely combine and (re)configure firm linkages to create valued market outputs. Possessing dynamic 
capabilities, which reflect one’s “ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external com-
petences” [69, p. 516], firms with access to strategic linkages respond to market changes by reconfig-
uring or even terminating existing strategic linkages with other firms. The study by Pagani [51] in the 
multi-media industry supports the notion of network orchestration. Pagani [51, p. 629] postulates that 
“as modularization takes hold, the ability to coordinate among the modules will become the most valu-
able business skill”. Strategic linkages and configurations are synonymous with interfirm modularity 
[68], where multiple platformized firms supply buildings blocks and components to create modularized 
goods and services within digitalized value networks [2, 80]. 
2.5 Digital Platform Competition 
Extant literature has explored how platforms compete with one another from three perspectives, namely, 
product, multi-sided, and ecosystem [71]. From a product platform perspective [36, 38], competitive-
ness is achieved by controlling a stable platform core that acts the technological foundation for a family 
of platform derivatives. Firms with product platforms usually compete through economies of scale and 
scope, which are realized based on innovation of the core and peripheries. Originating from industrial 
economics, the multi-sided platform perspective [39, 41, 60] holds that competitive platforms embody 
positive networks effects whereby the value of a platform depends on the population and growth of 
distinguishable users (e.g., buyers and sellers on Amazon). Studies belonging to this research stream 
focuses on identifying efficient matching mechanisms (e.g., pricing) to entice and galvanize users 
against rival platforms. Finally, the platform ecosystem perspective places emphasis on the composition 
and configuration of technological components. Platforms in possession of superior technological com-
ponents and configurations are deemed to be competitive in the marketplace [9, 10] because they tend 
to produce favorable conditions for soliciting contributions from third parties (e.g., external develop-
ers), thereby culminating in positive network effects. 
Prior research on platform competition within the payment industry has largely subscribed to the multi-
sided platform perspective [11, 59]. Beyond a few exceptions from the computer or software industry 
[9, 10], there is a paucity of studies that shed light on how platforms compete from a technological 
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viewpoint in highly regulated industries such as that of the mobile payments market.  
2.6 Digital Platforms 
Digital platforms are layered modular technology architectures within business networks [54, 74, 80]. 
Within these business networks [3], platforms can orchestrate technological components to foster co-
innovation with cooperative stakeholders, who might also be competitors among themselves [5, 51]. 
Additionally, platforms can house competitors within the same platform stack (e.g., Amazon and Ap-
ple) [80]. From the above description, it is thus conceivable that digital platforms resemble the techno-
logical manifestations of interfirm strategic linkages within networked economies. We therefore build 
on past studies about platform ecosystems to elicit determinants of digital platform competition that 
correspond to the modular composition (similar to strategic linkages) of such platforms as well as their 
configurations (similar to strategic linkage configurations). 
Value Creation Architectures: The first strategic dimension of digital platform competition lies in the 
modular composition or strategic linkages among stakeholders in a network. Simply put, platforms 
supply the technical foundation for third parties (e.g., external developers) to develop complementary 
platform derivatives (e.g., iOS apps) on separate layers of a platform (e.g., service layer) [80]. In so 
doing, platform owners (e.g., Apple) leverage on boundary resources (e.g., APIs) [20, 27] to channel 
the creativity of network members towards the development of value-added derivatives. Because plat-
forms supply developmental tools (or building blocks) for other platform members, an enduring chal-
lenge for platform owners is governance. Platform owners are constantly challenged to enforce control 
and support generativity (i.e., unprompted changes by heterogeneous audiences) [81], while ensuring 
reciprocal value appropriations [22, 73, 77]. Platforms have the (business) logic of transforming re-
sources into valuable market outputs. In this regard, platforms compete within value networks by of-
fering the best resource configuration (i.e., stable core and flexible derivatives) with the greatest added 
value. We hence define value creation architecture as modular components of a digital platform that 
can be exploited by third parties to develop value-added derivatives. 
Value Delivery Architectures: The second strategic dimension of digital platform competition stems 
from the configuration of strategic linkages among stakeholders belonging to a value network. In other 
words, for platforms to efficiently diffuse derivatives across their value network, they rely on access to 
technological backbones in the form of digital infrastructures (e.g., Internet) [31, 33, 67, 72]. Hanseth 
and Lyytinen [31, p. 4] conceive digital infrastructures “as a shared, open…heterogeneous, and evolv-
ing socio-technical system…of [IT] capabilities”. Likewise, Henfridsson and Bygstad [33, p. 908] 
equate digital infrastructures with “the collection of technological and human components, networks, 
systems, and processes that contribute to the functioning of an information system”. Conversely, Tilson, 
et al. [72, p. 748] define digital infrastructures as “basic information technologies and organizational 
structures, along with the related services and facilities necessary for an enterprise or industry to func-
tion”. Consistent with the preceding theorizations, we define value delivery architecture as omnipresent 
digital infrastructures that operate as technological backbones of value networks to facilitate the effi-
cient delivery of standardized platform derivatives among stakeholders belonging to the same value 
network. One can see from our definition that the motivation behind why digital platforms strive for 
unimpeded access to digital infrastructures is to streamline the delivery of platform derivatives. Digital 
platforms lacking access to digital infrastructures, especially when these infrastructures are dominant 
and exclusive, will be compelled to either: (1) forge linkages with other firms that have access; or (2) 
utilize alternate access options that replicate established infrastructures. 
Platforms within network economies vary in their modularity and, by extension, compete on two stra-
tegic architectural dimensions: namely (1) value creation, and; (2) value delivery (see Figure 1). Spe-
cifically, platforms practice modularity on their value creation architectures (i.e., platform level) to 
(co)create value-added derivatives. Likewise, platforms also practice modularity on value delivery ar-
chitectures (i.e., infrastructure level) to deliver derivatives in a standardized format. We posit that plat-
forms exhibiting similar attributes along these two strategic dimensions should share identical compet-
itive instincts, and belong to the same strategic group (or platform profile). 
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Figure 1. Value Network 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
This study adopts an interpretive multiple case study approach to uncover competitive attributes that 
give rise to distinct platform-driven strategic groups (or platform profiles) [76, 79]. In this sense, we 
blend both exploratory (i.e., Theory I) and explanatory (i.e., Theory II) approaches [29] by synthesizing 
focal concepts from extant literature on platform and strategic groups to craft an analytical lens for: (1) 
identifying competitive attributes pertinent to platforms from an architectural standpoint; (2) deriving 
formal classifications of platform profiles, as well as; (3) disentangling how value creation, delivery, 
and competition unfold among these platform profiles. We deem the case study approach to be an ap-
propriate method of inquiry as it can answer both “how” and “why” questions in complex and nebulous 
research environments [79], a setting similar to the context of this study. Through an analysis of key 
actors within the UK mobile payments market, we seek to untangle the intertwining relationship be-
tween technological architectures and the competitive strategies pursued by these platform profiles. 
3.1 Research Setting: Mobile Payments Market in the United Kingdom (UK) 
Payment is an indispensable service within national economies. To guarantee secure and reliable pay-
ment services for an entire country, access to established payment infrastructures is subjected to strin-
gent and costly regulatory oversight. In this light, access to established payment infrastructures can be 
deemed to be an asset within the payment industry. To unravel the competitive attributes governing 
different platform profiles, we turn to the UK mobile payments market as our empirical context. The 
UK payments industry is in the midst of market convergence and transformation. Regulatory changes, 
falling transaction costs, and intensifying competition have culminated in the gradual deconstruction of 
once vertically integrated financial institutions (e.g., banks) by permitting new actors to enter the in-
dustry by disintermediating once lucrative value streams. Under this broader context, mobile payments 
have emerged as one of the most competitive market spaces in the payment industry. 
Due to massive growth opportunities in the mobile payments market, new payment providers are en-
croaching on territories that are held by market incumbents. Payment instruments have evolved from 
simplistic plastic payment cards to sophisticated digital payment applications that are installed on con-
sumers’ mobile devices. These mobile payment platforms move value between payers and payees in a 
digitized fashion, which in turn pose a threat to the payment incumbents (e.g., banks) that have tradi-
tionally occupied this space. These new mobile payment platforms could foster new consumption habits 
and decouple long-standing customer relationships with incumbents. To compete, payment incumbents 
are compelled to launch their own mobile payment solutions (e.g., Barclay’s Pingit) as a preemptive 
measure to maintain their relevance to existing customers. 
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Apart from the disruption brought on by emergent technologies, regulatory changes have also intensi-
fied market competition. UK payment regulators have called on incumbent payment scheme owners 
(e.g., Faster Payments2) to offer new payment providers non-discriminatory access to established pay-
ment infrastructures. These regulatory changes have enabled the new payment providers to interface 
their platforms with established payment infrastructures when moving value between payers and pay-
ees. Though the abovementioned regulatory changes are likely to accelerate competition among pay-
ment actors in the UK mobile payments market, there is notably little knowledge of how mobile pay-
ment providers, as owners of digital platforms, compete from an architectural standpoint. 
3.2 Case Selection: Six Distinct Platform Profiles  
To derive distinct platform profiles within the UK mobile payments market, 16 semi-structured inter-
views were carried out with five industry experts and 11 financial institutions offering mobile payment 
services. We began by conducting five semi-structured interviews with UK payment industry experts 
who are well-acquainted with the industry due to their unique position in the midst of the shake up in 
the fintech landscape (see Table 1). These initial interviews allow us to construct an overview of the 
UK payment industry and glean insights into the: (1) roles of key actors (e.g., banks, payment start-ups, 
acquirers or merchants’ bank, technology providers, payment infrastructure owners, and credit card 
firms) operating in the industry; as well as (2) explicit and implicit mechanisms underlying competition 
among these actors. 
From the expert interviews, we selected 11 UK financial institutions, which have been touted by the 
industry experts as revolutionary players in the mobile payments market, to serve as case companies 
for our study. Additional semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives from these 11 
financial institutions. Furthermore, to accurately position the 11 financial institutions within the UK 
payment industry landscape and authenticate claims made by the interviewees, we also gathered data 
from secondary sources (see Table 1). Guided by our analytical framework (see Figure 1), we inspected 
                                                             
2 Faster Payments Service (FPS) is a UK banking initiative to reduce payment times between customer bank 
accounts from three working days, which transfers usually take via the long-established BACS system, to typi-
cally a few hours. 
Table 1. Breakdown of Data Sources 
Financial Institution Primary Data Secondary Data 
Interviewee Time Source No. Articles 
Industry Experts 
Berenberg VP / Equity Analyst on Financial Technology 61 mins - - 
IBM Executive Architect, Banking and Financial Markets 72 mins - - 
Consult Hyperion Director of Innovation 48 mins - - 
Vocalink Strategy Lead 125 mins - - 
AMEX Mobile Product Innovation and Strategy 153 mins - - 
Banking Institutions 
Barclays (Pingit) SVP of Mobile Solutions 66 mins Finextra.com 120 
Thepaypers.com 10 
Blockchain.info Co-Founder 82 mins Finextra.com 2 
CEX.io Chief Information Officer (CIO) 45 mins Thepaypers.com 2 
Circle Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 45 mins Finextra.com 13 
CryptoPay Founder 112 mins Thepaypers.com 1 
Droplet Chief Technology Officer (CTO) 68 mins Thepaypers.com 2 
Google Wallet Head of Europe, the Middle East and Africa 65 mins Thepaypers.com 21 
HSBC Global Head of Mobile Payment 85 mins Finextra.com 39 
Thepaypers.com 1 
Paym Head of Development 65 mins Finextra.com 47 
Thepaypers.com 8 
Santander Innovation Analyst 210 mins Finextra.com 29 
Thepaypers.com 1 
Zapp  Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 44 mins Finextra.com 71 
Thepaypers.com 10 
Total 16 interviews 1,346 mins 2 sources 377 articles 
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the 11 cases with respect to the two strategic dimensions of value creation and value delivery architec-
tures. Our goal is to comprehend how these case companies design their respective mobile payment 
services to: (1) create value through co-innovation, and; (2) deliver value through access to established 
payment infrastructures. From the analysis of the 11 cases, six distinct platform profiles (or platform-
based strategic groups) surfaced according to attributes delineated across the strategic dimensions of 
value creation and delivery architecture. From our case pool, we present the six most prominent instan-
tiations corresponding to each platform profile. 
These six illustrative cases of mobile payment services are either operated by incumbent financial in-
stitutions or owned by market leaders in the payment industry, namely: (1) Pingit (Barclays); (2) Drop-
let (payment start-up); (3) Paym (collaborative payment solution devised by consortium of UK banking 
institutions); (4) Zapp (Vocalink, a payment technology provider); (5) Blockchain.info (blockchain 
start-up), and; (6) Circle (blockchain start-up). To capture novel fintech actors that differ significantly 
in their technological approach to payment processing, we have opted to include two blockchain start-
ups. Blockchain is an emerging technology for digital value transfer (e.g., payment systems) that repli-
cates the functionalities of established payment infrastructures. We selected two pervasive blockchain 
start-ups: Blockchain.info and Circle. Both startups leverage on the Bitcoin blockchain technology to 
transfer digital value (i.e., Bitcoins) among payers and payees. Whereas end users of Blockchain.info 
have to convert Bitcoins into fiat currency (e.g., British pounds) via a third party (e.g., Bitcoin ex-
change), their counterparts in Circle can perform direct conversion between Bitcoins and fiat currency. 
We chose these blockchain companies because they not only operate in the UK, they are also recognized 
as global leaders with respect to the level of venture capital investment garnered and the size of their 
user base. Besides, Circle is the first Bitcoin startup in the world to be granted an e-money license by 
UK regulators, thereby enabling the company to form sustainable banking relationships and negotiate 
access to established payment infrastructures [55]. 
3.3 Data Collection 
Data for this study were gathered from two sources: 16 semi-structured interviews and secondary ar-
chival records (see Table 1). Semi-structured interviews have the advantage of permitting the inter-
viewer to glean extra insights (e.g., publicly inaccessible data) that may enrich the study further. The 
interview protocol was devised in accordance with our analytical framework and contained questions 
that have been formulated to unravel the mechanisms underpinning how each of the 11 mobile payment 
services works in practice. Specifically, when interviewing representatives from the 11 financial insti-
tutions, we not only asked them to reconstruct both narratively and visually how a typical transaction 
could be executed on their respective mobile payment platforms, but we also probed them on the iden-
tity of external partners who are instrumental in supplying the necessary capabilities and resources to 
generate the service offering. All semi-structured interviews were recorded and subsequently tran-
scribed for coding purposes. Apart from the interviews, we also distilled the product pages of the 11 
mobile payment platforms together with payment reports, white papers, and press releases from indus-
try associations (e.g., the European and UK Payments Council) as well as online news outlets (e.g., 
Finextra.com) and news aggregators (i.e., ThePaypers.com) reporting on the payment industry (see Ta-
ble 1). Through the collection of data from secondary sources, we can triangulate insights gleaned from 
interviews with events documented in the public domain. 
For detailed presentation of the six illustrative fintech cases of mobile payment services, we draw pri-
marily on interviews conducted with the: (1) Senior Vice President (SVP) of Mobile Solutions at Bar-
clays to shed light on Pingit; (2) Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Zapp; (3) Head of Development at 
Paym; (4) Chief Technology Officer (CTO) of Droplet; (5) Co-Founder of Blockchain.info, and; (6) 
CEO of Circle, as well as secondary archival records that have been extracted for each service. 
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3.4 Data Analysis 
The analysis of the empirical data was performed in three steps: (1) industry analysis, (2) intra-case 
analysis, and; (3) inter-case analysis. Table 2 gives a synopsis of how interview quotes were coded in 
accordance with content analytical techniques. 
 
Table 2. Coding Examples from Data Analysis 
Dimension Exemplary Quote Intra-Case Analysis Inter-Case Analysis 
V
al
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n 
A
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te
ct
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e 
Pi
ng
it 
Quote 1: It has to be, of course, then commercially 
relevant to be disclosing any API's to that party…it's 
very much about providing information into, or to, 
the Pingit app as opposed to integrating Pingit into 
another app, for example. 
Pingit is moderating plat-
form access such that co-
creation value streams are 
inwards and orientated to-
wards the platform. 
Whereas Pingit maintains 
stringent control over the 
ability of external devel-
opers to develop value-
added derivatives on its 
mobile payment platform, 
Paym practices the oppo-
site. Consequently, Pingit 
competes by ensuring the 
consistency and quality of 
its service offerings while 
Paym competes by mobi-
lizing third parties to en-
gage in co-innovation. 
Pa
ym
 
Quote 2: [Paym] facilitates payments but it doesn’t 
do payments itself directly.  
Quote 3: The way the service works, assuming you 
and I both registered through our banks, I would log 
into my mobile banking application, I would select 
the Paym option and then I can send money to you by 
sending it to your phone number 
Quote 4: It's an extension of the functionality that a 
banking app that I have on my phone offers me. 
Paym shares its platform 
with third parties such 
that the co-creation value 
streams are reciprocal in 
nature. 
V
al
ue
 D
el
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y 
A
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te
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e 
Pi
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it 
Quote 5: when we use the Faster Payment infrastruc-
ture we as, of course, is one of the founders of the 
Faster Payments infrastructure we have connectivity 
into the Payments Councils Faster Payments product. 
Barclays, as the owner of 
Pingit and co-owner of 
the Faster Payments pay-
ment infrastructure, has 
direct access to send and 
receive payments in UK. 
Both Pingit and Paym has 
direct access to an estab-
lished payment infrastruc-
ture by virtue of their par-
ent financial institution. 
Consequently, competi-
tive differentiation be-
tween Pingit and Paym is 
hard to achieve in terms 
of their value delivery ar-
chitecture. 
Pa
ym
 
Quote 6: Faster Payments is the UK's real-time ac-
count-to-account transfer banking [infrastructure], 
Paym is a way of driving more transactions through 
that banking [infrastructure]. 
Quote 7: I'm then providing my bank with the in-
struction to make a payment and that payment will ei-
ther go through Faster Payments or it will go 
through Link and those are the two approved, two 
supported, payment schemes in this service. 
Paym has direct access to 
an established value de-
livery architecture. 
 
§ Industrial Analysis: After a careful review of the primary and secondary dataset, the first author 
reconstructed the empirical landscape to derive an overview of the underlying mechanisms in the 
UK payment industry: how it is structured and governed, who are the key actors, as well as; exist-
ing strategic linkages among these actors. The objective of this industrial analysis was to disentan-
gle interorganizational linkages that are required for processing payment transactions throughout 
different payment infrastructures.  
§ Intra-Case Analysis: The first author drafted comprehensive case descriptions to outline the busi-
ness logic underpinning each mobile payment service. Guided by the research questions and theo-
retical concepts from strategic groups and platform literature, the first author applied content ana-
lytical procedures [34, 57] to code and interpret the primary interview data in an iterative manner 
to unpack the logic of mobile payment platforms from an architectural viewpoint [21, 76, 79]. 
Specifically, the coding is aimed at pinpointing the modular attributes, which constitute the value 
creation architecture of each platform, and the eventual configuration of strategic linkages with 
third parties that constitute their value delivery architectures (see Table 2).  
§ Inter-Case Analysis: Inter-case analysis was performed to enhance the generalizability of our 
study [46, 79]. By comparing the cases in terms of their value creation and value delivery archi-
tectures, we discovered commonalities and discrepancies among these distinct platform profiles 
(see Table 2). Particularly, we identified six distinct platform profiles. To ensure the analytical 
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consistency of our findings, we applied a differentiated role strategy after the initial data analysis 
[1]. The first author acted as the primary data collector and coder. The co-authors, on the other 
hand, played the role of the devil’s advocate by putting forth alternative interpretations and coun-
ter-arguments. Whenever disagreements surfaced, codes were revisited and discussed until con-
sensus was reached. The entire coding process followed an iterative cycle and data analysis was 
only completed when all authors agree on the placement of quotes in accordance with the analytical 
framework. 
4. CASE ANALYSIS: ILLUSTRATIVE MOBILE PAYMENT PLATFORMS 
Platformization has opened the door for mobile payment services to revolutionize how value is created 
and delivered through interfirm co-innovation. In this section, we present insights gleaned from analyz-
ing the 11 mobile payment platforms. From our data analysis, we identified six platform-driven strate-
gic groups (or platform profiles) within the UK mobile payment market, each with its own innovative 
approach to configuring its value creation and delivery architectures. Table 3 summarizes the platform 
profiles derived from our data analysis. We draw on these illustrative case examples to elaborate on the 
competitive attributes for each platform profile.  
 
 Table 3. Platform Profiles 
Value Delivery Architecture 
Direct Access Indirect Access Open Access 
V
al
ue
 C
re
at
io
n 
A
rc
hi
te
ct
ur
e 
In
te
gr
at
iv
e 
Pingit (Monopolistic) 
Value Creation Architecture 
Integrative: Internal development, 
vertically integrated platform, cap-
turing value without third parties   
Value Delivery Architecture  
Direct: Having direct access to es-
tablished payment infrastructures 
(e.g., Faster Payments) 
Droplet (Assimilative) 
Value Creation Architecture  
Integrative: Internal development, 
vertically integrated platform, cap-
turing value without third parties   
Value Delivery Architecture 
Indirect Access: Relying on third 
parties to have access to established 
payment infrastructures (e.g., 
BACS). 
Circle (Hybrid) 
Value Creation Architecture 
Integrative: Internal development, 
vertically integrated platform, cap-
turing value without third parties   
Value Delivery Architecture 
Indirect Access: Relying on third 
parties to have access to established 
payment infrastructures (e.g., 
VISA, MasterCard) 
Open Access: Unobstructed access 
to the bitcoin network 
In
te
gr
at
ab
le
 
Paym (Coopetitive) 
Value Creation Architecture 
Integratable: Interorganizational 
platform, capturing value with third 
parties   
Value Delivery Architecture 
Direct: Having direct access to es-
tablished payment infrastructures 
(e.g., Faster Payments) 
Zapp (Inclusive) 
Value Creation Architecture 
Integratable: Interorganizational 
platform, capturing value with third 
parties   
Value Delivery Architecture  
Indirect Access: Relying on third 
parties to have access to established 
payment infrastructures (e.g., 
Faster Payments) 
Blockchain.info (Open) 
Value Creation Architecture 
Integratable: Interorganizational 
platform, capturing value with third 
parties   
Value Delivery Architecture 
Open Access: Unobstructed access 
to the bitcoin network. 
 
4.1 Pingit  
In 2012, Barclays launched its own internally-developed mobile payment service: Pingit (Figure 2). 
Pingit was initially designed to be a person-to-person (P2P) mobile payment service and as a standalone 
application, it registered solid growth in its user base, which in turn incentivized businesses to adopt 
Pingit. It is a proprietary mobile payment service as its design and development are fully internalized. 
As alleged by the Senior Vice President (SVP): “We have a very rapid development cycle…we’re doing 
a release every month [updates]…so anytime we’re adding to those features…we’re really adding to 
the long-term benefit of the product…we have a significant team that’s developing and supporting those 
products or sub-products…under the Pingit umbrella”. Additionally, Pingit offers developmental tools 
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to approved external developers to build related applications and extend the reach of its value creation 
architecture: “It has to be, of course, commercially relevant to be disclosing any API’s to that party…it’s 
very much about providing information into, or to, the Pingit app as opposed to integrating Pingit into 
another app…the Techstars [start-up] accelerator program was enormously successful, [the goal is] 
to have a different set of APIs that kind of the startup app development world can use in a slightly 
different way” (SVP).  
 
 
Figure 2.  Pingit Mobile Payment Platform 
Pingit (see Figure 2) has a dual approach to process payment transactions. For Pingit users (i.e., payers 
and payees) who are Barclays’ customers, the settlement occurs internally within the Pingit platform in 
real-time. As the SVP elaborated: “A consumer [pushes] the money which is what a Pingit transaction 
[is]…we can just move the money from one Pingit account to another”. By housing a closed loop sys-
tem, Pingit harnesses efficiencies from economies of scale by processing transactions internally within 
its own platform. For Pingit users (i.e., payers and payees) who are not affiliated with Barclays, Pingit 
is still able to serve them by leveraging on its value delivery architecture. Barclays is a founding mem-
ber of the Faster Payments scheme that grants Pingit direct access to an established payment infrastruc-
ture to process interbank transfers in near real-time. As the SVP remarked: “we use the Faster Payments 
infrastructure, of course, as one of the founders of the Faster Payments infrastructure we have connec-
tivity”.  
Value Creation Architecture: Pingit pursues an independent approach to the development of its plat-
form when competing with other mobile payment services. By denying other banking institutions from 
interfacing with Pingit, Barclays exercises total control over the value creation architecture of its inbuilt 
platform. But at the same time, Pingit is open to customers from rival banking institutions, who crave 
a mobile payment solution. As the SVP clarified: “As a competitive bank, [rival banking institutions] 
can’t use Pingit but as a consumer…it’s an open market from a consumer perspective…it’s our product 
and our service and we use it as a differentiator from the other banks in the space”. Having a large user 
base, Pingit is also in a comfortable position to dictate its collaborative relationships with external par-
ties, who desire to develop approved platform derivatives for the mobile payment service. In turn, it 
expands the reach of Pingit’s value creation architecture in both service diversity and quality. 
Value Delivery Architecture: Through Barclays, Pingit possesses the competitive advantage of having 
direct access to the Faster Payments payment infrastructure, the dominant value delivery architecture 
for processing real-time payments. This enables Pingit to serve non-Barclays customers who have bank 
accounts at rival banking institutions. In this aspect, Barclays’ value delivery architecture (i.e., Faster 
Payments) plays a pivotal role in bolstering the appeal of Pingit to potential customers beyond its own 
institutional borders. 
Monopolistic Platform: By resembling a monopolistic, self-contained mobile payment service on its 
value creation architecture, Pingit maximizes the value to be gained from its proprietary platform tech-
nology. Furthermore, with respect to its value delivery architecture, Pingit has taken advantage of its 
direct access to an established payment infrastructure (i.e., Faster Payments) to reach out to customers 
at rival banking institutions in a cost-efficient manner. 
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4.2 Droplet 
Launched in 2012, Droplet (see Figure 3) is a Birmingham-based mobile payment startup that allows 
small businesses and individuals to perform mobile payment transactions within brick and mortar 
stores.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Droplet Mobile Payment Platform 
By promoting itself as the ‘Skype for payments’, Droplet’s core value proposition stems from its market 
position as a free payment service for both payers and payees. Built on standard hardware and open 
source software, Droplet’s standalone application is an internally developed payment service that grants 
the company absolute control over how its service can be tailored to address market needs. As the Chief 
Technology Officer (CTO) explained: “The software is Linux, we don’t use any Microsoft technologies 
anywhere in the stack at all…the vast majority of our frameworks are open source, but obviously our 
[own software] isn’t open source”. As for granting platform access to external developers, the CTO 
stated: “We’ve seen a couple of companies build experimental things on Droplet which has been great 
and really exciting… but not to the level that we want…without [API keys3] it won't work so they need 
to apply to us for that [API key] …We can revoke that [API keys] at any time if we want to”.  
To exploit the full potential of its value creation architecture in facilitating mobile payments between 
payers and payee, Droplet not only forges strategic linkages with financial institutions whereby payers 
can top-up their Droplet accounts via direct bank transfers or debit cards linked to their personal bank 
accounts, but it also offers approved developmental tools (i.e., APIs) to external developers for building 
their own Droplet-related applications. Through supplying boundary resources (i.e., approved develop-
mental tools) as part of its value creation architecture, Droplet encourages external developers to gen-
erate their own platform derivatives with customized business rules to meet the ongoing needs of the 
market.  
With regard to its value delivery architecture, Droplet is dependent on both direct debit providers to 
withdraw the top-up amount directly from customers’ bank accounts (e.g., GoCardless) and payment 
infrastructure access providers (e.g., Ingenico) for debit card top-ups. As soon as a payment infrastruc-
ture access provider receives a top-up request on behalf of Droplet, it will credit the payment into Drop-
let’s bank account. Afterwards, transactions among Droplet customers are instantly settled within its 
                                                             
3 API keys are authentication codes that must be incorporated into third-party applications to gain access to the 
developmental tools (i.e., APIs) offered by Droplet.  
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internal system. In this way, the money in Droplet’s bank account remains untouched during transac-
tions. As the CTO acknowledged: “We are quite insulated from the real world of banking… [payment 
transactions] can carry on infinitely with no costs to us and no money movement”. For those customers 
who would like to withdraw money from their Droplet accounts and exit the platform, Droplet instructs 
its bank to send what are known as cost convenient payment batches (i.e., BACS4 payment) to the 
beneficiaries. 
Value Creation Architecture: Droplet adheres to an independent approach to the development of its 
platform to minimize its dependency on external developers. Droplet operates a self-contained mobile 
payment service that is realized through a blend of self-developed software, inbuilt APIs, and off-the-
shelf hardware. By pursuing such an approach, Droplet achieves agility in platform development in that 
it can acquire capabilities externally [69] to respond to fast changing market environments. By housing 
a closed loop system, Droplet competes through the provision of instantaneous payments that occur 
within its platform boundaries. This in turn significantly reduces its variable cost structure: “The plan 
is to grow the system to a scale where more transactions happen inside our economy and reduce our 
overall reliance on money in and money out…no money is moved at all. This can carry on infinitely 
with no cost to us and no money movement…so we have merchants in our economy that then buy things 
from other merchants using their Droplet balance” (CTO). 
Value Delivery Architecture: Droplet has indirect access to the BACS payment infrastructure to move 
money out of its platform. BACS is an established payment infrastructure renowned for its affordability 
but slow settlement speed. Droplet cooperates with multiple interchangeable access providers to main-
tain its flexibility. As the CTO admitted: “[These payment providers] are all interchangeable, so if we 
want to switch suppliers, we switch suppliers and nothing changes [for Droplet]”. Consequently, in the 
absence of direct access to established payment infrastructures, Droplet partners with multiple payment 
infrastructure access providers to optimize indirect access for its value delivery architecture and acquire 
efficiency gains for market competition. 
Assimilative Platform: Droplet is a self-contained mobile payment service that assimilates external 
resources to maintain independency on its value creation architecture. Likewise, Droplet’s loose coali-
tion with payment infrastructure access providers to indirectly access predominant value delivery ar-
chitectures gives it the flexibility to depress its cost structure by switching partners when necessary. 
4.3 Paym 
Launched in 2014, Paym (see Figure 4) is a mobile payment service that was initially owned by the UK 
Payment Council and later by its institutional members. The Payment Council is an industry consortium 
whose membership encompasses most major British financial institutions (e.g., banks and building so-
cieties). 
 
Figure 4.  Paym Mobile Payment Platform 
                                                             
4 Bankers' Automated Clearing Services (BACS) is the payment infrastructure for the clearing and settlement of 
automated payment methods in the UK such as direct debit. 
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The Payment Council was inaugurated with a mandate of nurturing the continuous growth of the UK 
payment industry. Paym is fully developed and operated by an external payment technology provider 
called Vocalink. Interestingly, Vocalink is also the technology provider for several UK payment infra-
structures (e.g., Faster Payments). As alluded to by the Head of Development: “Vocalink [is] our IT 
provider…we’ve contracted with Vocalink to provide the database and the associated functionality 
around it…we went out to tender and Vocalink won the tender and then built the product that we had 
specified”. Born out of the collaboration between the Payment Council and Vocalink, Paym endows 
UK banking institutions with the capacity to offer mobile payment services to their existing customers. 
In contrast to Pingit and Droplet, Paym is not a standalone application, but rather operates as a module 
within existing mobile banking applications developed by institutional members of the Payment Coun-
cil. Paym hence exists as an interoperable mobile payment service that accommodates diverse banking 
applications (e.g., HSBC and Santander). In this sense, Paym, unlike Pingit and Droplet, does not ex-
ercise control over its value creation architecture by vetting platform derivatives developed by partner-
ing banking institutions. Instead, by positioning itself as a module which can be inserted into existing 
mobile banking applications, Paym functions as a interorganizational platform to connect Paym-linked 
bank accounts across partnering banking institutions for processing push payments and accommodate 
the development of firm-specific platform derivatives. 
Paym perpetuates traditional relationships among banking institutions and payment infrastructures 
(e.g., Faster Payments). The Head of Development mentioned: “The idea is that you already trust your 
bank, you get this functionality and then everybody can send money to each other using their existing 
relationship…I'm then providing my bank with the instruction to make a payment and that payment will 
either go through Faster Payments or it will go through LINK and those are the two approved, two 
supported, payment schemes in this service”. 
Value Creation Architecture: Paym pursues a collaborative approach on its value creation architecture 
to encourage interfirm modularity among banking institutions to develop competitive mobile payment 
services. Envisioned as an interoperable mobile payment service, the development of Paym has been 
deliberately subcontracted to an external payment technology provider (i.e., Vocalink) who is familiar 
with pre-existing interorganizational dependencies among banking institutions and can ensure the in-
teroperability of the platform across a wide range of mobile banking applications. By being highly 
integratable across heterogeneous banking applications, Paym attains its competitiveness by acting as 
an inclusive mobile payment service: “The idea is that I can sign up for Paym and I don’t need to create 
a new relationship with a new financial services provider…it's an extension of the functionality that my 
[mobile banking app] already offers” (Head of Development). 
Value Delivery Architecture: Paym, as a mobile payment service offered by the UK banking consor-
tium, has, on its value delivery architecture, direct access to Faster Payments, an established payment 
infrastructure with real-time processing of financial transactions. Paym thus facilitates regular bank 
wire transactions so much so that it serves to solidify the current market positions of banking institu-
tions. As the Head of Development asserted: “The bank platform talks directly to Paym and Paym talks 
directly back to the bank platform…those are the only connections that exist”. 
Coopetitive Platform: By integrating into existing mobile banking applications developed by banking 
institutions that are also engaged in rivalry with one another, Paym competes on its value creation ar-
chitecture by fueling this rivalry to foster competition in developing firm-specific platform derivatives 
and better its payment services. Conversely, since banking institutions are already interconnected by 
having direct access to an established payment infrastructure (i.e., Faster Payments), the competitive-
ness of Paym on its value delivery architecture is miniscule. 
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4.4 Zapp  
Zapp (see Figure 5) is a mobile payment service owned by the UK payment infrastructure provider, 
Vocalink.  
 
 
Figure 5.  Zapp Mobile Payment Platform 
Like the three aforementioned mobile payment solutions, Zapp is designed to facilitate mobile pay-
ments between payers and payees. However, for its value creation architecture, Zapp shares common-
alities with Paym. Similar to Paym, Zapp’s value creation architecture stems from its modularization: 
it is positioned as a module which can be inserted into existing mobile banking applications. For this 
reason, Zapp is reliant on contemporary banking partnerships. As the CEO explained: “It’s a feature 
within the [mobile banking] app … that essentially turns a banks mobile banking app into a vehicle to 
make payments. So, if you like, we are the messaging service that sits like a scheme between banks on 
one side and acquirers and merchants on the other side and we manage the flow of information in order 
to make a payment”. To initiate payments, Zapp has only indirect access to the Faster Payments pay-
ment infrastructure. In this setup, banks act as proxies to initiate payments on behalf of Zapp between 
payers’ and payees’ bank accounts. Not unlike Paym, Zapp reinforces traditional relationships among 
banking institutions and payment infrastructures. The CEO emphasized that “Zapp works as part of 
their [mobile banking] app - it’s re-intermediating the bank into [customers’] relationship”.  
Value Creation Architecture: Zapp pursues a collaborative approach on its value creation architecture 
in that it primarily competes through modularity. It invites banking institutions and other businesses 
(i.e., merchants) to integrate its modularized mobile payment service into their applications and develop 
firm-specific platform derivatives. To achieve interoperability and resilience, technology development 
is developed partially in-house with certain operations being subcontracted to an external vendor (i.e., 
Oracle). Zapp thus attains competitiveness by being an inclusive mobile payment service that is ame-
nable to a variety of businesses and financial institutions. 
Value Delivery Architecture: Zapp has indirect access to the Faster Payments payment infrastructure 
because it functions primarily as an interorganizational platform to connect bank accounts across bank-
ing institutions to form a mobile payment network. Consequently, Zapp configured its strategic linkages 
with financial institutions in the form of indirect access to an established and fast processing value 
delivery architecture. 
Inclusive Platform: Zapp competes by being an inclusive platform that strives to be readily accessible 
for various actors in the payment industry (e.g., banking institutions, merchants, and acquirers) by being 
integratable into external payment systems. Additionally, Zapp is dependent on collaborations to gain 
indirect access to established value delivery architectures for processing payments. This perpetuates 
conventional value streams within the payment industry and solidifies the competitive position of cur-
rent market incumbents. 
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4.5 Blockchain.info 
Founded in 2011, Blockchain.info is a London-based Bitcoin startup that offers three main products: 
search, bitcoin wallets, and Bitcoin developer tools. Through the free online wallet service, Bitcoin 
owners can store and transfer them through the Bitcoin network whereas the search engine provides 
analytics about the status of the network (e.g., recent transactions or volume). The Bitcoin wallet service 
is targeted towards non-technical users, whereas more adept users utilize Blockchain.info’s open APIs. 
The APIs on this platform permit external developers to integrate the preceding services (e.g., bitcoin 
wallets or analytics) into their own service offerings. (See Figure 6.) 
 
 
Figure 6.  Blockchain.info Mobile Payment Platform 
Access to the APIs is open to all. As proclaimed by the co-founder of Blockchain.info: “We are tech-
nologists that focus on building APIs that make using Bitcoin protocol simple and easy…our APIs are 
tool sets for anyone who is impassioned to create innovative [bitcoin] ideas”. Referring to its free 
Bitcoin wallet service: “We serve consumers who want a simple and easy way securely store their 
Bitcoins, and transact with anyone they want to” (co-founder). Blockchain.info is an independent 
startup that is not reliant on other technology providers by operating its own local servers. At the same 
time, the platform is highly open and accessible to external developers by giving them the freedom to 
integrate parts of Blockchain.info’s value creation architecture into their applications. As elaborated by 
the co-founder, Blockchain.info’s APIs are documented and publicly available without restriction: “Our 
APIs are basically gateways to interface with any type of protocol, so we are highly compatible, we are 
entirely open, there are no walled gardens” (co-founder). 
Value Creation Architecture: Like Paym and Zapp, Blockchain.info also subscribed to an integratable 
approach for its value creation architecture. Blockchain.info’s source code for various services (e.g., 
Bitcoin wallet) is publicly accessible, thereby providing external developers with the opportunity to 
review and improve code quality. Moreover, external developers can copy and modify the code in ac-
cordance with their needs to create derivative service offerings. By crowdsourcing ideas from its devel-
oper community, Blockchain.info is able to improve the quality of its services by collating and integrat-
ing these ideas into its own services after an internal review process. As the co-founder stated: “Our 
lead developer approves pull requests that come from the community and he obviously reviews the code, 
we go through a testing regiment…and then we release it.” 
With regards to its hardware, Blockchain.info is, to a large degree, an isolated service because it does 
not utilize cloud computing (e.g., Amazon AWS). Rather, it operates its own servers to ensure inde-
pendence and security over customers’ Bitcoin deposits. As the co-founder articulated: “From a hard-
ware perspective, we have a large amount of infrastructure, we use dedicated hardware, we never use 
cloud services…we do that for privacy reasons… [what we are doing], it’s very unusual, most people 
would not do that, they would run hardware by Amazon, and would cost a fraction what we would pay”. 
Software-wise, the co-founder explained: “On the Github repository, we have everything in the public 
domain and it [is being] constantly used and collaborated upon by people that [are not] Blockchain.info 
employees”. 
Value Delivery Architecture: For its value delivery architecture, Blockchain.info depends solely on the 
Bitcoin network to deliver Bitcoins between payers and payees. As soon as the Bitcoin payment is 
broadcasted to the Bitcoin network, specialized computers (i.e., Bitcoin miners) around the globe re-
ceive transaction requests and verify them through cryptography. These verified transactions are then 
recorded in a publicly distributed ledger system (i.e., Bitcoin blockchain), which is essentially a P2P 
book-keeping system of all transactions since the inception of the Bitcoin blockchain.  
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Open Platform: Blockchain.info increases its market share by leveraging on external developers and 
subsidizing its service (e.g., Bitcoin wallets) for customers. In doing so, Blockchain.info, as a platform, 
derives value from the Bitcoin community by being integratable into various agnostic third-party ser-
vices. This culminates in positive conditions to reinforce and extend Blockchain.info’s competitive po-
sition. To deliver Bitcoins throughout the Bitcoin network, Blockchain.info operates on top of the 
Bitcoin Blockchain, which is an open value delivery architecture without access constraints. 
4.6 Circle 
Founded in 2013, Circle (see Figure 7) is a Boston-based Bitcoin startup that offers mobile payment 
service in the form of Bitcoin brokerage and free wallets targeted towards end users. Compared to 
Blockain.info, Circle does not endorse an open developer program that could harness Circle’s APIs. 
With its independent value creation architecture, Circle, has the ambition to transform Bitcoin into an 
accepted payment currency. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Circle Mobile Payment Platform 
The CEO articulated: “We want to make it easy to store and move value in the same way that people 
store and share content messages on the Internet…people use [currencies] in everyday life, they are 
paid in certain currencies and they understand their purchasing power in those currencies, goods and 
services are priced that way, but we also want that to work globally…in an interoperable way, the way 
the Internet works, which is…this instant and distributed system that supports the instantaneous move-
ment of data and that is all money is, is just data”. Through its e-money license, which requires regu-
latory compliance (e.g., know your customer (KYC)), Circle, on its value delivery architecture, pos-
sesses an advantage of having indirect access to established payment infrastructures. Consequently, in 
addition to being able to settle transactions among Circle customers instantaneously within its own 
platform, payments can also be processed through: (1) established payment infrastructures (i.e., VISA 
and MasterCard), and; (2) the Bitcoin network. 
Value Creation Architecture: Circle’s value creation architecture is relatively independent as it has the 
internal resources and capabilities to operate its own payment service, and is not tied to any specialized 
external resources. As the CEO maintained: “We’ve build our own digital banking platform from 
scratch in house, designed around kinds of user experiences that we think that are important for a 
global person-to-person payment application…we leverage on cloud infrastructure…our core transac-
tional infrastructure of our payment and banking system is all built in house”. 
Value Delivery Architecture: Circle, on its value delivery architecture, forged strategic linkages to gain 
access to two separate digital infrastructures: (1) established payment infrastructures (e.g., MasterCard, 
VISA), and; (2) the Bitcoin network. The CEO claimed that “we want to support…an open Internet of 
value and so that’s why in addition to integrating into the legacy central banking systems, legacy card 
networks…we also want to support an open protocol which is the Bitcoin Blockchain”. 
Hybrid Platform: Circle functions as an independent and hybrid platform that does not rely on interfirm 
modularity. Furthermore, Circle forged strategic linkages to harness efficiencies from two separate 
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value delivery architectures: (1) established payment infrastructures to process transactions in fiat cur-
rencies, and; (2) the Bitcoin Blockchain for permissionless global value transfer to emulate direct access 
rights to an established payment infrastructure. 
5. DISCUSSION 
In networked economies, goods and services are derived from layered modular architectures in the form 
of digital platforms [26, 64, 68, 80]. Digital platforms play a pivotal role in networked economies be-
cause they constitute nodes within business networks from which value is concentrated [66]. Because 
past studies on digital platforms are confronted with conceptual ambiguities and challenges in compa-
rability, de Reuver et al. [16] advanced a research agenda that places emphasis on the importance of a 
unified vocabulary and comparative analysis when investigating digital platforms. 
In this study, we embrace a technological view of digital platforms that dissects mobile payment plat-
forms as layered modular technology architectures [80]. From this viewpoint, we theorized that digital 
platforms compete through architectural configurations, which strive to generate more value in com-
parison to their rivals [51]. Specifically, we delineated platforms into value creation and delivery archi-
tectures, both of which constitute strategic dimensions pertinent for deciphering competition among 
mobile payment platforms. Competitive platforms differentiate among themselves through engaging in 
fintech innovations that emphasize the significance of modular composition and configurations to in-
duce positive network effects within business networks [51, 78]. Figure 8 offers an overview of the core 
findings from our data analysis. By inductively deriving competitive attributes along the strategic di-
mensions of value creation and value delivery architectures, we arrived at a taxonomy of six platform 
profiles. Findings suggest that digital platforms compete in the marketplace by being: (1) either inte-
grative or integratable on their value creation architecture, and; (2) having direct, indirect, or open 
access to pre-existing value delivery architectures to move value among stakeholders within the net-
work.  
 
 
Figure 8.  Value Creation & Delivery Architectures 
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5.1 Value Creation Architectures: Integrative and Integratable Approaches 
Integrative Approach: Mobile payment platforms (i.e., Circle, Droplet, and Pingit), which subscribes 
to an integrative approach, can exert control on their value creation architectures at the platform level 
to co-create value with an exclusive selection of private business partners and shield their services from 
unauthorized parties. These platforms enact closed loop systems to settle payment transactions within 
their own boundaries. Settling payment transactions among users within the same payment system is 
virtually free, instantaneous, and guaranteed. Conversely, sending payments beyond the closed loop 
system contributes to the cost structure in terms of fees, time, and risk. Integrative platforms tend to 
assimilate resources and arrange access points in ways that culminate in an inward-looking, vertically-
integrated, and closed-loop ecosystem (see Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9.  Integrative and Integratable Value Creation Architectures 
But to reap rewards from economies of scale, integrative mobile payment platform must deliver a com-
pelling service to attain critical mass. From the illustrated cases, all integrative platforms have their own 
standalone mobile payment service to regulate derivatives being developed on top of their value crea-
tion architectures and ensure a consistent user experience. Independence in the value creation architec-
ture allows integrative platforms to be nimble in responding to dynamic markets environments [61]. 
However, to ensure competitive sustainability, owners of integrative platforms must be sufficiently 
equipped and adept to continuously nurture their internal developmental capabilities to remain an en-
ticing option for business partners within such private value networks. Otherwise, integrative platforms 
may have to relinquish their tight control and embrace interfirm modularity to compensate for deficien-
cies in their value creation architectures. This in turn could dilute their integrative approach to value 
creation. 
Integratable Approach: Platforms with integratable value creation architectures connect and mobilize 
stakeholders within business networks. The outcome is a mobile payment platform in which the respon-
sibility of value creation and appropriation is distributed among stakeholders within the network (see 
Figure 9 again). Blockchain.info, Paym, and Zapp exhibit characteristics of integratable platforms in 
that their services are designed with collaboration in mind and they intentionally co-innovate with ex-
ternal developers to extend the capabilities and market reach of their value creation architecture. Paym’s 
payment feature is designed with the explicit intention of complementing existing mobile banking ap-
plications. By integrating Paym’s modularized payment service into mobile banking application, Paym 
connects these mobile banking applications to form an interorganizational mobile payment platform. 
Likewise, Zapp’s value creation architecture, like that of Paym, is designed to be integratable into ex-
isting mobile banking applications as a modularized payment service, thereby leading to the formation 
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of an interorganizational mobile payment platform. Conversely, even though Blockchain.info has its 
own standalone applications targeted towards customers, Blockchain.info’s mobile payment service is 
highly attractive for third parties (e.g., business startups) because it is designed to be integratable into 
their existing applications without the need for permission. Platforms with integratable value creation 
architectures modularize and exploit interorganizational resources to co-create value within an orches-
trated business network. We define the structure from platforms taking such a collaborative approach 
as a federated value network. 
On a cautionary note, an interorganizational platform encounters challenges from reduced control, in-
creased transaction costs, misalignment between business and IT, as well as intense rivalry among 
stakeholders. In other words, if the costs of maintaining integratable platforms outweigh the benefits of 
cultivating interorganizational collaboration, owners of such platforms may be inclined to turn to an 
integrative approach to achieve flexibility in responding to business opportunities. 
5.2 Value Delivery Architectures:  Three Modes of Access 
Direct Access: Mobile payment platforms with direct access to established value delivery architectures 
are often able to profit from these industry-specific resources (see Figure 10). Pingit (Barclays) and 
Paym, which have unobstructed access to established payment infrastructures, compete by exploiting 
their direct access rights to deliver guaranteed and instantaneous mobile payment services via these 
value delivery architectures. Direct transactions delivered through Pingit and Paym reinforce their di-
rect access rights, their status as payment platforms, and ultimately their contemporary market posi-
tions. Direct access to established value delivery architectures, which offer the greatest possible market 
reach within an economy, is tantamount to a valuable configuration of strategic linkages that cannot be 
emulated by competing platforms readily. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Direct, Indirect, and Open Value Delivery Architectures 
Nonetheless, direct access comes with the burden of costly maintenance (e.g., monthly fix and variable 
costs) as well as extensive coordination between platform and infrastructure owners. Moreover, such 
value delivery architectures, being critical national infrastructures, are heavily regulated. Direct access 
owners (e.g., banking institutions) are legally obliged to offer non-discriminatory indirect access to rival 
institutions. To overcome this disadvantage, integrative payment platforms with direct access (e.g., 
Pingit) attempt to reduce direct access challenges by creating their own vertically-integrated, closed 
loop mobile payment system to settle payment transactions within its own boundaries. Transactions 
settled within integrative platforms suppress variable costs. For financial institutions that have direct 
access but do not possess the competency to develop an integrative platform (e.g., Paym), they join up 
with owners of interoperable mobile payment services (or interorganizational platforms) to achieve 
competitiveness and customers relevance. The downside is that such an arrangement demands costly 
direct access for each transaction to serve customers at other financial institutions even though these 
institutions operate on the same interorganizational platform. This in turn adds to the variable cost 
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structure. 
Indirect Access: Mobile payment platforms with indirect access to established value delivery architec-
tures achieve competitiveness by cooperating with third parties (e.g., banking institutions) offering the 
best indirect access conditions (see Figure 10 again). In our study, Droplet and Zapp do not possess 
direct access rights. To compensate for the lack of this industry-specific resource, both platforms forged 
strategic linkages with third parties. For instance, Droplet is versatile by partnering with multiple finan-
cial intermediaries. Droplet applies a plug-and-play strategy in selecting interchangeable intermediaries 
that offer the most economical indirect access options. Zapp, on the other hand, formed hard-to-replicate 
strategic linkages with banking institutions that have privileged direct access rights to established pay-
ment infrastructures. 
Challenges associated with indirect access stem from platforms’ dependency on third parties and ongo-
ing transaction costs that accompany each usage, alteration, and adjustment of the value delivery archi-
tecture. This also implies that third parties can impose constraints on mobile payment platforms when-
ever a transaction is initiated that requires access to established payment infrastructures. To outweigh 
these costs and ensure competitiveness, integratable mobile payment platforms with indirect access 
(e.g., Zapp) forged strategic linkages with select third parties in the business network that has the fur-
thest market reach and can guarantee real-time processing of payments. Alternatively, integrative plat-
forms with indirect access (e.g., Droplet) harness their internal capabilities to create a complementary 
closed loop system that emulates direct access attributes (i.e., instant and guaranteed payments). This 
way, platforms with indirect access can circumvent the restrictions of slow value delivery architectures 
(e.g., BACS) when sending payments across financial institutions. 
Open Access: Mobile payment platforms with open access achieve competitiveness by leveraging novel 
value delivery architectures (e.g., Bitcoin blockchain). Open access endeavors to emulate direct access 
rights (i.e., unobstructed payment without intermediaries) in a cost-effective fashion (see Figure 10). 
Nevertheless, new value delivery architectures do not have the same market reach as that of established 
ones nor have they been comprehensively tested. To overcome this, Circle incorporates both indirect 
and open access to simultaneously access the fiat money network and also service customers within the 
Bitcoin network. Still, Circle’s indirect access comes with its own costs. To maintain indirect access to 
established payment infrastructures and sustain partnerships with incumbent financial institutions, Cir-
cle must invest in internal resources to comply with national laws (e.g., anti-money laundering). This 
is because customers who transact purely within the Bitcoin network are normally not identifiable due 
to Bitcoin’s permissionless and pseudonymous nature. 
Blockchain.info does not possess connectivity to established payment infrastructures. Besides, Block-
chain.info has no intention of leveraging on pre-existing value delivery architectures because it aims to 
acquire a dominant position within the Bitcoin network. To accomplish this, Blockchain.info is highly 
integratable on its value creation architecture while facilitating third part transactions through open 
access over its value delivery architecture (i.e., Bitcoin blockchain). However, Blockchain.info faces 
hurdles in that the Bitcoin network, at the time of writing, is still in its infancy with unproven business 
processes and competing technological standards. Consequently, it cannot match up to pre-existing 
value delivery architectures in terms of its speed, reliability, and market reach. 
5.3 Three Types of Platform Competition Strategies 
Germination Strategy: Monopolistic and assimilative platform profiles resonate with what we label as 
the strategy of germination. The germination strategy allows firms to cultivate and grow private busi-
ness networks by capturing value without intervention from third parties at the platform level. In this 
sense, value streams are tightly controlled and directed inwards to reinforce an insular platform. Pingit 
(Monopolistic) and Droplet (Assimilative) possess the resources and capabilities to implement a self-
sustaining platform by shielding their value creation architecture from third parties. For their value 
delivery architectures, both platforms showcase high independency and flexibility in channeling their 
value outputs (i.e., payments) through pre-existing value delivery architectures. The challenge here is 
to maintain agility by avoiding the enactment of strategic linkages with partners that will introduce long 
term legacy systems or platform derivatives on their value creation architectures. With regards to value 
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delivery architectures, the germination strategy has an ambivalent relationship. Platforms rely on both 
direct and indirect access to value delivery architectures to process transactions, while at the same time, 
reduce their outflow as much as possible to reduce costs. Continuous payment outflows could under-
mine the germination strategy of platforms. 
Orchestration Strategy: Platforms with coopetitive and inclusive profiles adhere to what we label as 
the orchestration strategy. In this regard, Paym (Coopetitive) and Zapp (Inclusive) designed their plat-
forms to be highly integratable with existing mobile banking applications. The challenge of an orches-
tration strategy is to derive a value creation architecture that aligns the business and technology interests 
among platform stakeholders. For value delivery, the orchestration strategy is highly dependent on es-
tablished value delivery architectures to connect stakeholders and attain high levels of joint market 
reach. However, each transaction on pre-existing value delivery architectures contributes to the cost 
structure for each platform stakeholder even though they belong to the same mobile payment service. 
Transformation Strategy: Platforms with hybrid (Circle) and open (Blockchain.info) profiles reverber-
ate with what we label as the transformation strategy. Transformations within technology industries are 
mainly driven by two factors: product and processes innovations [75]. Tushman and Anderson [75] 
argued that for non-assembled goods (i.e., commodities), process innovation is more critical as com-
pared to product innovation. In this study, platforms with transformation strategy embrace process in-
novation to deliver payments through differentiated and cost-effective arrangements. This is realized 
through forging strategic linkages with novel value delivery architectures (i.e., Bitcoin blockchain). In 
this regard, Blockchain.info and Circle attempt to introduce architectural innovation in the mobile pay-
ments market. Particularly, both companies can circumvent the dominance of pre-existing value deliv-
ery architectures even though novel value delivery architectures, in the likes of Blockchain, bear the 
risk of failing to become a dominant standard in value movement. 
5.4 Implications for Theory and Practice 
In conclusion, this study touches on how fintech in the likes of mobile payment services have leveraged 
on digital platformization to revolutionize their value creation and delivery architectures. Digital plat-
formization has also provided opportunities for new financial service providers to free themselves from 
traditional financial institutions such as banks by altering how these mobile payment services compete 
with one another. This study thus contributes to extant literature on digital platform competition on 
three fronts. First, we performed a comparative analysis of mobile payment services in the UK market 
to inductively derive attributes along the two strategic dimensions of value creation and delivery archi-
tectures through which these fintech innovate to compete with one another. From these attributes, we 
classify mobile payment services into six distinct platform profiles and articulate the competitive strat-
egy associated with each profile. One of the key findings for this study is that the competitiveness of 
digital platforms is dictated by their competitive attributes, as derived from firm-specific resources and 
capabilities, along the two focal dimensions of value creation and delivery architectures. Specifically, 
the study identifies two competitive attributes (i.e., integrative and integratable) for the dimension of 
value creation architecture and three competitive attributes (i.e., direct, indirect, and open) for the di-
mension of value delivery architecture in determining the platform profile. In turn, the interplay between 
these two strategic dimensions shape platform strategy, leading to either germination, orchestration, or 
transformation strategy in relation to how these fintech seek to redefine their competitive landscape. 
By adopting mobile payment services as our empirical context, this study contributes to extant literature 
on platform and strategic management by uncovering the direction of value streams and explicating 
how such value streams can be appropriated by these fintech. Specifically, integrative platforms tend 
to internalize value from private business networks by shielding themselves from third parties. Con-
versely, integratable platforms extract value from federated business networks by promoting the devel-
opment of interorganizational platform derivatives in a reciprocal manner. 
Lastly, this study extends prior research on innovation by showcasing how fintech innovations, when 
coupled with digital platforms, can support an ambidextrous approach towards innovation. As is evident 
from the case of Circle, the modularity of platforms enables these fintech to revolutionize the compet-
itive landscape on two fronts concurrently. One, such platforms facilitate modular innovation on the 
value delivery architecture to sustain the logic of established payment infrastructures. Two, such digital 
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platforms can culminate in architectural innovation in the same technology stack, which in turn could 
culminate in the replacement of pre-existing value delivery architectures with new ones (e.g., Bitcoin 
blockchain). Successful architectural innovation has the potential of delivering significant competitive 
advantage over market incumbents as it destroys the basis of their competitiveness, namely direct access 
to established payment infrastructures in the context of mobile payments market. 
From a practitioner viewpoint, we not only support strategic planning on the part of platform owners 
by increasing their awareness for critical reflections of their architectural configurations and potential 
business partners, but we also inform policy makers in drafting legislative frameworks to foster inno-
vation in the current revolutionary fintech landscape. This paper is constrained in its generalizability, 
as the case studies were conducted in the UK mobile payments market. These limitations translate into 
future research avenues for replicating our study in other platform-driven markets to validate and refine 
our taxonomy of platform profiles beyond the UK mobile payments market. 
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